We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent …scal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond …nance de…cits. Households and the …scal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We …nd that outcomes are a¤ected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the …scal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its e¤ects on ‡uctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little e¤ect on the provision of government services, it does cause the …scal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.
Introduction
Risk-sensitive preferences are used increasingly to study questions related to consumption risk, welfare, and asset pricing. Often motivated in the context of the Ellsberg paradox, such preferences can be derived from ambiguity aversion or by concerns for robustness to model misspeci…-cation (Hansen and Sargent, 2008) and represent a special case of Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences. Placing risk-sensitive households in a real business cycle model, Tallarini (2000) shows that business cycle ‡uctuations can have large welfare e¤ects and that the model can generate a low risk-free rate. Related work by Croce (2006) …nds that stylized facts about the risk-free rate and the equity premium can be accounted for in a stochastic growth model containing capital adjustment costs when households have Epstein-Zin preferences.
In this paper, we consider the problem facing a benevolent …scal authority that must formulate and conduct …scal policy in an environment in which households and …rms are optimizing. In this economy, the …scal authority taxes linearly household income in order to …nance the provision of government services, while lacking a commitment technology and the ability to bond-…nance de…cits. Households exhibit the standard aversion to risk in consumption and leisure (and government services), but they are additionally assumed to be risk-sensitive decisionmakers, averse to risk in expected future utility. We use this model as a laboratory to investigate the e¤ects that risk-sensitive preferences have on the business cycle, asset prices, and the provision of government services in a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
We …nd that household risk-sensitivity, but not …scal-authority risk-sensitivity, induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises importantly the stochastic steady state level of capital. Further, although household risk-sensitivity e¤ects the stochastic steady state, its e¤ects on economic volatility are small, a …nding that is consistent with Tallarini (2000) . At the same time, we …nd that although risk-sensitivity has little e¤ect on how the economy responds to positive technology shocks, its e¤ects for the case of negative technology shocks are more pronounced. In addition, due to its e¤ect on capital's stochastic steady state, we show that increases in household risk-sensitivity serve to lower the risk-free rate, the return to equity, and the equity premium. However, holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate slightly, raise the return on equity slightly, and increase the equity premium. But, the increase in the equity premium produced is small, suggesting that risk-sensitive preferences, in isolation, leave much of any observed equity premium unexplained, consistent with Croce (2006) . Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little e¤ect on the provision of government services, it does cause the …scal authority to lower the income tax rate.
As noted above, the …scal authority in our model lacks the ability to commit. For this reason, the equilibria that we study are Markov-perfect rather than Ramsey. In this respect, our study is related to work by authors such as Ortigueira (2006) Martin (2010) , however, the model we study is stochastic, allows for risk-sensitive preferences, and we focus on the business cycle and asset pricing rather than on steady state outcomes. And, where Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) do solve a model that is stochastic, they do not allow households to make a labor-leisure choice or allow for risk-sensitive preferences. Our analysis is most closely related to Tallarini (2000) , who studies business cycles, asset prices, and welfare in a real business cycle model in which households are risk-sensitive. We di¤er from Tallarini (2000) in that our model contains a …scal authority, and in that it considers Markovperfect …scal policy. We also di¤er from Tallarini (2000) in that our model allows both households and the …scal authority to be risk-sensitive decisionmakers, in that we focus on transitory rather than permanent shocks, and in that we compute equilibria using a global method. 2 One novel aspect of our model is that households and the …scal-authority are each risksensitive decisionmakers. As is well-known (Hansen and Sargent, 2008) , this risk-sensitivity can alternatively be motivated by ambiguity aversion or by robustness considerations, allowing us to remain agnostic about its precise motivation. There are very few papers that analyze models in which multiple agents are risk-sensitive, but Svec (2012) provides a notable example. Svec (2012) examines Ramsey equilibria in a Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy in which households are robust decisionmakers and in which the …scal authority can be either "political" (maximize household welfare under the household's subjective probability model) or "paternalistic" (maximize household welfare under the true probability model). 3 Svec's political and paternalistic 1 Our study is also related to the body of work that examines Markov-perfect and/or Ramsey equilibria in models that exclude capital (such as Stockman (2001) , Chugh (2006) , and Sorger (2008, 2009) ). And it is related to literature that examines the optimal …nancing of an exogenous stream of government spending (such as Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) , Domínguez (2007) , and Aguiar and Amador (2011) ). 2 Because there is no strategic interation in Tallarini's (2000) model, he is able to compute equilibrium using a linear-quadratic dynamic programming method. 3 Karantounias (2013) performs a related exercise, also using a Lucas and Stokey (1983) model, focusing on Ramsey equilibria in which the …scal authority is "paternalistic". …scal authorities are two special cases of our decision-making framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and describes the decision problems facing the households, …rms, and the …scal authority. Section 3 discusses the model's parameterization and derives and discusses the system of equations that must be solved to compute equilibrium. Section 4 presents the main results while Section 5 examines the sensitivity of the main results to alternative parameterizations of the model. Section 6 concludes. An appendix presents the numerical method used to compute equilibrium.
The model
We consider a production economy populated by a unit-mass of identical atomistic households, a unit-mass of identical atomistic …rms, and a …scal authority. Firms rent capital and hire labor from households and use these inputs to produce goods that are sold to households and the …scal authority. Goods sold to the …scal authority are transformed costlessly into a government consumption good while those sold to households are either consumed or used to augment the capital stock. The …scal authority taxes household income, using the revenue to …nance the provision of the government consumption good. Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Households and the …scal authority are each assumed to be risk-sensitive decisionmakers.
Households
Households own the capital stock. They receive income by renting their capital and supplying their labor to …rms at prices r k t and w t , respectively. After paying income tax, households use their remaining income to purchase goods, which they use to o¤set capital-depreciation, to invest in their capital stock, and to consume. The representative household's lifetime utility function is summarized by
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, h 0 characterizes household risk-sensitivity, c t denotes private consumption, l t denotes leisure, G t denotes consumption of government services, and the momentary utility function u (c t ; l t ; G t ) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and to satisfy the Inada (1963) conditions. A simple application of L'Hôpitals'rule shows that equation (1) converges to the standard recursive formulation
in the limit as h " 0 while the e¤ects of h < 0 are to distort the continuation value, a distortion arising from the household's aversion to risky future utility.
The capital owned by the representative household evolves over time to satisfy the ‡ow budget constraint
where 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate, t > 0 is the tax rate applied to household income (with a tax-allowance for capital-depreciation), k t is the household's stock of capital as of the beginning of period t, and h t is hours worked. Households maximize their expected lifetime utility, equation
(1), subject to their ‡ow-budget constraint, equation (2), and their time resource constraint
taking prices, the tax rate, and the provision of government consumption as given.
Firms
The stand-in aggregate …rm employs capital and labor to produce output according to the neoclassical production technology
where Y t represents aggregate output, K t denotes the aggregate capital stock as of the beginning of period t, H t denotes aggregate hours worked, and z t is an aggregate technology shock that obeys the law-of-motion
where 2 (0; 1) and t i:i:d: 0; 2 .
Markets for capital and labor are perfectly competitive and clear at the prices
respectively, with the stand-in aggregate …rm making zero-pro…ts in equilibrium.
Fiscal authority
The …scal authority cannot impose lump-sum taxes, but receives revenue by taxing household income at marginal rate t > 0. These tax revenues are used to purchase goods from …rms that are transformed costlessly into government consumption goods (or government services) and provided to households at zero-unit-cost. The …scal authority has no outstanding liabilities and cannot issue bonds. As a consequence, the …scal authority's decisions about taxation and the provision of the government consumption good, decisions made to maximize
where f 0 characterizes the …scal-authority's risk sensitivity, are constrained by the balancedbudget condition
Importantly, f need not equal h , which allows the …scal authority and the representative household to di¤er in regard to their risk-sensitivity. "paternalistic" …scal authority), but more generally the framework allows the …scal authority to be either more or less risk-sensitive than the representative household.
Information, timing, and aggregation
With the current realization for the aggregate technology given by z t , we denote the history of realizations for aggregate technology up to and including period t by z t = fz i g t i=0 . Similarly, using x t = z t k t K t 0 to denote the economy's state at the beginning of period t, we assume that at the beginning of period t all agents are endowed with the information set given by the history x t . After entering period t, and having observed x t , the …scal authority makes its decision; households and …rms make their decisions simultaneously, but subsequent to the …scal authority.
With this timing protocol, within the period, the …scal authority has a …rst-mover advantage with respect to households and …rms. 4 Our assumptions that households and …rms are identical and that they are of unit-mass implies that K t = k t , C t = c t , H t = h t , and L t = l t in aggregate.
Solving the model
To simplify the exposition, we assume from the outset that the momentary utility function for the representative household is of the iso-elastic form
where f c ; l ; G ; ; g > 0 and that the production function is Cobb-Douglas
where 2 (0; 1), with the aggregate technology shock obeying equation (5).
With the …scal authority having a …rst-mover advantage within each period, we begin by formulating the decision problem for the representative household. Using the household's time resource constraint to substitute for leisure, the representative household solves the decision problem described by the Bellman equation
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
taking r k t , w t , and t as given, and the initial conditions k t = K t > 0, z t > 0, known. From this Bellman equation, and employing the Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) condition, we obtain …rst-order necessary conditions, which after aggregating across identical households and employing equations (6)- (7), can be written as
Equation (12) is, of course, an aggregate version of the consumption Euler equation while equation (13) summarizes aggregate labor supply. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
Turning to the …scal authority, its decision problem is described by the Bellman equation
with the constraints given by equations (12)- (14) and by the government budget constraint,
taking next-period's policy function
as given.
Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for this model is a collection of household decision rules
and a collection of value functions, fv (z t ; k t ) ; V (z t ; K t )g, such that
1. The collection fv (z t ; k t ) ; c (z t ; k t ) ; h (z t ; k t ) ; k (z t ; k t )g solves the household's decision problem described by the Bellman equation, equation (10), and the constraint, equation (11). 2. The collection fV (z t ; K t ) ; C (z t ; K t ) ; H (z t ; K t ) ; K (z t ; K t ) ; G (z t ; K t )g solves the …scal authority's decision problem described by the Bellman equation, equation (15), and the constraints, equations (9), (12)- (14), and (17).
We apply value function iteration to the …scal authority's problem to compute equilibrium, employing Chebyshev polynomials to approximate the unknown functions; this procedure is summarized in Appendix A. Turning to the remaining parameters, the values assigned to most parameters are quite standard. The elasticities of substitution in the momentary utility function are each assumed to equal 1:00, so that the momentary utility function is linear in logs (consistent with Tallarini (2000)),
Parameterization
while the weights, and , are chosen so that households spend about 40 percent of their available (i.e., non-sleeping) time working and so that government spending is around 20 percent of output. The value for the depreciation rate, , is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is about 12. Finally, the parameters that govern the shock process are also relatively standard, with the persistence parameter, , set to 0:95 and the standard deviation for the technology innovations, , set to 0:01.
Although the benchmark model has h = f = 0:00, these parameters are varied between 0:00 and 0:10 in the analysis with risk sensitivity that follows. While apparently small in magnitude, as we shall see, variations in h and f between 0:00 and 0:10 correspond to relatively large variations in risk aversion and produce a large precautionary-saving motive.
Results
In this section we solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the benchmark model and for various speci…cations with risk-sensitive preferences. For each of speci…cation we compute the stochastic steady state values, standard deviations, and correlations with output, and impulse responses for the key aggregate variables, and we compute the risk-free rate, the return to equity, and the equity premium (asset returns and the equity premium are reported in percentage points per quarter). Our main results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 Allowing for risk-sensitive preferences, the net-return on a risk-free one-period real bond is de…ned by
which illustrates the connection between risk-sensitivity and the discount factor, . In the limit as h " 0, equation (18) simpli…es to the standard expression with iso-elastic utility. Similarly, the one-period real return on equity is given by 5
where the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity and income-taxation enter through their impact on capital and labor. Equation (19) shows that the return on equity is a decreasing function of the capital-labor ratio.
The "deterministic"steady state results reported in Table 2 correspond to the steady state in a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a nonstochastic version of the benchmark model. However, because risk-sensitivity generates no risk-adjustment when the model is nonstochastic, the deterministic steady state is the same for all speci…cations. Allowing the model to be stochastic, but keeping the two risk-sensitivity parameters, h and f , equal to zero, leads to a stochastic steady state in which capital is slightly higher than in the deterministic model (comparing columns 2 and 3). Although capital is higher on average, this does not translate into higher output. Instead, output falls slightly as households lower their supply of labor. Looking at how output is allocated, investment remains relatively unchanged, but a larger share of output is allocated to personal consumption and a smaller share of output is allocated to government services. It follows from 5 An alternative, equivalent, expression for the one-period real return on equity is r e t+1
, where the term in brackets corresponds to the dividend payment. Table 2 that the benevolent …scal authority responds to uncertainty by lowering the income tax rate. The level of the equity premium is due almost entirely to the fact that the returns to equity are subject to income tax. Introducing households with risk-sensitive preferences, but retaining f = 0 (corresponding to a paternalistic …scal authority), leads to substantive changes in the stochastic steady state.
In particular, comparing columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 it is evident that risk-sensitivity produces a strong precautionary-saving motive and raises capital in steady state from 25:912 to 31:919, an increase of almost 25 percent. Although hours-worked do rise, the large increase in capital raises considerably the capital-labor ratio, pushing down both the risk-free rate and the return to equity. With capital and labor both rising, the steady state value for output also rises, with this increase in output allocated disproportionately to consumption and, to a lesser extent, investment.
Although government spending increases in steady state, it declines as a share of output, signalling a fall in the income tax rate. Thus, the paternalistic …scal authority's response to risk-sensitive households is to lower the income tax rate, supporting the household's desire to increase capital and facilitating a substitution away from government services and toward private consumption.
Turning to the case in which the …scal authority is "political" ( f = h ), it is evident, through comparing columns 4 and 5, that the steady state outcomes are largely una¤ected by the …scal authority's risk-sensitivity.
Where the analysis above considered steady state outcomes, we now investigate the e¤ect that risk-sensitivity has on decision rules, speci…cally on the household's decision rules for consumption and labor, and on the …scal authority's decision rules for government spending and the tax rate.
We report the decision rules in Figure 1 , displaying them as a function of the capital stock only. This is achieved by numerically integrating with respect to the technology shock in order to compute the conditional expectations E[C (
Figure 1: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on decision rules
Looking at the household's consumption decision rule shown in Figure 1 , panel A, two results are apparent. First, although risk-sensitivity has a large impact on the consumption decision rule, it is the household's risk-sensitivity that matters not the …scal authority's. Second, the e¤ect of risk sensitivity on the consumption decision rule is to lower the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (capital), as re ‡ected in the fact that the risk-sensitive decision rules have slightly ‡atter slopes than the benchmark decision rule. By consuming less from their wealth, a precautionary saving e¤ect induced by risk-sensitivity, households increase their saving, and with the goods saved allocated to investment the outcome is higher capital in equilibrium (as shown in Table 1 , above, and in Figure 2 , below). The household's labor decision rule (panel B) is also a¤ected materially by the household's risk-sensitivity (and not much by the …scal authority's risk sensitivity), with the risk-sensitivity raising the household's supply of labor for each level of capital. Accordingly, the household's aversion to risky future utility leads it to increase hours-worked in order to increase savings and thereby boost expected future income.
Turning to the …scal authority's decision rule for government spending (panel C), unlike consumption and labor, neither the household's risk-sensitivity nor the …scal authority's risksensitivity has much e¤ect on the decision rule for government spending. To the extent that there is an e¤ect, it is to raise government spending at each level of capital. Thus, although muted, the …scal authority seeks to address the decline in private consumption and the rise in hours-worked with an increase in government services. The response is greater for the "paternalistic" …scal authority than for the "political" …scal authority. Although the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on government spending appear to be small, the e¤ects on the tax rate (Panel D) are somewhat larger, with increasing risk-sensitivity lowering the tax rate schedule. By lowering the tax rate schedule the government assists households in accumulating capital, which provides a bu¤er against the risk that households fear.
Where Table 2 presented information about (stochastic) steady state outcomes, Figure 2 presents the unconditional densities of the key variables. We construct these unconditional densities by simulating data from each model, linearly interpolating over capital and the technology shock. Figure 2 : The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the asymptotic equilibrium
The densities in Figure 2 reinforce the results in Table 2 and Figure 1 . Not only does the …scal authority's risk-sensitivity have little e¤ect on decision rules or steady state outcomes, but it has little e¤ect on the entire distribution of outcomes, with consumption and government services providing modest exceptions. Figure 2 , panel A, shows that the …scal authority's risk-sensitivity impacts the density for consumption when consumption is low while panels B and F show that the …scal authority's paternalism shifts the densities for government spending and the tax rate systematically to the right. The household's risk-sensitivity, on the other hand, has a large impact on the densities of all variables. Notably, however, although some changes in volatility can be discerned (and are reported in Table 3 below), Figure 2 makes clear that the principle e¤ect of the household's risk-sensitivity falls on the mean of each variable.
The e¤ect that risk-sensitivity has on the business cycle is examined in Table 3 , which focuses on volatilities and correlations, and in Figures 3 and 4 , which focus on impulse responses to positive and negative technology shocks, respectively. The benchmark results in Table 3 indicate that private consumption is less volatile than output, that investment is considerably more volatile than output, that the volatility of government spending is about equal to that of private consumption, and that these variables, and labor, are all strongly positively correlated with output. Table 3 : The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the business cycle Benchmark h = 0:1; Allowing households and/or the …scal authority to be risk-sensitive has little e¤ect on the volatilities and correlations reported in Table 3 , a …nding that is consistent with Tallarini (2000) .
To the extent that risk-sensitivity does impact these statistics it serves to lower the volatility of all variables, but most noticeably the volatility of government services and investment. This result makes intuitive sense, because risk-sensitive households are averse to volatility and their aversion induces them to employ decision rules that mitigate volatility. 6 Figures 3 and 4 display how the key variables respond following a one-standard-deviation shock to aggregate technology; Figure 3 displays responses to a positive shock while Figure 4 displays the responses to a negative shock. In response to a positive technology shock, Figure 3 shows that the benchmark model responds to the improved technology with a rise in investment (panel D) and labor (panel E), rises brought about through the higher marginal productivity of capital and labor, which raises output (panel A). With the technology shock lifting household income, households increase their demand for private consumption (panel B), government services (panel D), and leisure. 7 The tax rate (Panel F), declines immediately following the shock, with the …scal authority allocating the bene…ts of increased income partly through higher government spending and partly through lower taxation. Relative to the responses for the benchmark model, the e¤ects of risk sensitivity can be seen largely to lower the responses of private consumption and government services to the shock, consistent with the declines in volatility reported in Table   3 . Interestingly, relative to the benchmark responses, with risk-sensitive preferences the declines in labor, investment, government spending, and output are all damped on the impact of the (adverse) technology shock. As a consequence, the medium-term decline in capital is also less than that for the benchmark model, which facilitates higher private consumption and higher government spending.
The remainder of this section explores the e¤ect that risk-sensitive preferences have on the risk-free rate, on the return to equity, and on the equity premium, focusing on the case where the economy is populated by a "political" …scal authority ( h = f ). The return on each asset, and the resulting equity premium, are calculated two ways. First we calculate returns holding the discount factor, , constant at 0:99, while varying the risk-sensitivity parameters, h = f , between 0 and 0:1. Second, recognizing that the stochastic steady state varies with movements in the risk-sensitivity parameters, we next calculate returns varying h = f between 0 and 0:1, while adjusting the discount factor, , in order to keep the stochastic steady state for capital unchanged from its benchmark value ( adjusted). The results are shown in Figure 5 , where the asset-returns and the equity premium are plotted against the absolute value of the risk-sensitivity parameters.
Figure 5: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on annualized asset returns and the equity premium Considering …rst the asset-returns calculated keeping the discount factor equal to 0:99, while the level of the equity premium is driven by the tax on capital income, it is clear from Figure 5 that the e¤ect of risk-sensitivity is to lower the risk-free rate (panel A), lower the real return on equity (panel B), and to lower the equity premium (panel C). These results arise largely from the increase in the stochastic steady state value for capital that occurs as households become increasingly risk sensitive. As described above, we counteract this increase in steady state capital by adjusting the discount factor, and report the ( adjusted) results in Figure 5 alongside those where is kept constant. When the discount factor is adjusted to keep unchanged the model's stochastic steady state for capital, the e¤ects of risk sensitivity are to lower slightly the risk-free rate, raise slightly the return to equity, and to raise slightly the equity premium. The results in Figure   5 are consistent with Tallarini (2000) and they suggest that although risk-sensitive preferences may be able to account for a low risk-free rate, that additional mechanisms, such as long-run consumption risk arising through permanent technology shocks, or more importantly, and capital adjustment costs, as per Croce (2006) , are needed to explain the equity premium.
Sensitivity analysis
The previous section examined the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on asset returns, the business cycle, and the conduct of …scal policy under the assumption that the momentary utility function was linear in logs, i.e., under the assumption that c = l = g = 1. In this section we brie ‡y investigate whether the main …ndings of that section are sensitive to alternative values for these parameters. To be speci…c, we now consider the model's behavior in equilibria in which there is no risk-sensitivity ( h = f = 0), in which the …scal authority is paternalistic ( h = 0:1; f = 0), and in which the …scal authority is political ( h = f = 0:1) for parameterizations in which, alternately, c = 5, l = 2, and g = 5. Of interest is not whether the model behaves di¤erently when the curvature parameters are changed, but whether these curvature paramters materially interact with risk-sensitivity. The results are summarized in Table 4 , which reports the stochastic steady state outcomes for the various speci…cations and complements Table 2 . The …ndings in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 2 . In particular, for each value for the curvature parameters in the momentary utility function the introduction of risk-sensitive households has a large e¤ect on the stochastic steady state outcomes, largely through its impact on capital accumulation. However, although household risk-sensitivity a¤ects importantly the stochastic steady state, whether the …scal authority is risk-sensitive or not is largely immaterial, as seen in the fact that the statistics for the political …scal authority are almost identical to those for the paternalistic …scal authority.
Focusing now on the speci…cation for which c = 5, Table 5 reports the volatilities and correlations with output of the key variables. The results in Table 5 con…rm those for the benchmark parameterization examined in section 4. Regardless of whether either households and/or the …scal authority are risk-sensitive, the volatilities of the key variables and their correlations with output are largely una¤ected. And to the extent that they are a¤ected, the e¤ect of risk-sensitivity is to lower volatility and raise the correlations with output. Clearly, in keeping with the benchmark parameterization, the presence of risk-sensitivity has important e¤ects on the stochastic steady state, but negligible e¤ects on the business cycle.
Conclusion
This paper examined the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the business cycle, …scal policy, and asset returns in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Our model is one in which a …scal authority must use a linear income tax to …nance optimally a government consumption good, while lacking the ability to commit and the ability to bond-…nance …scal de…cits. Further, our model assumes that households and the …scal authority are risk-sensitive decisionmakers. This model extends the work of (2000) by introducing a risk-sensitive …scal authority, and by focusing on Markov-perfect equilibria that are computed using a global method.
We …nd that household risk-sensitivity produces a powerful precautionary-saving motive, which raises importantly the stochastic steady state level of capital. However, although household risk-sensitivity e¤ects the stochastic steady state, its e¤ects on economic volatility are small.
Furthermore, we …nd that while risk-sensitivity has relatively little e¤ect on how the economy responds to positive technology shocks, its e¤ects for the case of negative technology shocks are much larger. In addition, due to its e¤ect on capital's stochastic steady state, we …nd that increases in household risk-sensitivity serve to lower the risk-free rate, the return to equity, and the equity premium. However, holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate slightly, raise the return to equity slightly, and increase the equity premium. In regard to the …scal authority, somewhat surprisingly, the key …nding is that the model's behavior is qualitatively and quantitatively una¤ected by whether the …scal authority is risk-sensitive or not.
Although it extends existing work in important dimensions, the model that we have analyzed could feasibly be made still more sophisticated. In future work, we plan to examine whether risksensitivity matters more for …scal policy, asset prices, and the business cycle in models containing features such as variable capital utilization, capital-adjustment costs, monopolistic competition, investment-speci…c technology shocks, and permanent technology shocks.
turn to the Bellman equation for the …scal authority, which using equation (23) , is approximated by V (z t ; K t ) = max fGt;K t+1 g 2 4 C(zt;Kt;Gt)
